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Case No. 20080103 
I N THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
RYAN HOYER and RICHARD F. HOYER, 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
vs. 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Defendant-Appellee. 
STATE OF UTAH'S ANSWER B R I E F 
The Defendant State of Utah respectfully submits this brief in 
response to Plaintiffs' opening brief on appeal. 
Statement of Jurisdiction 
This Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this appeal 
because Plaintiffs failed to timely file their notice of appeal under Rule 
4(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure or to amend or refile that 
untimely notice after being granted an extension of time to appeal 
pursuant to appellate rule 4(e). The State previously raised and fully 
briefed this issue in its motion for summary dismissal and supporting 
memoranda. On May 8, 2008, this Court deferred the State's motion for 
plenary consideration here. 
Should the Court determine it possesses jurisdiction to proceed, that 
jurisdiction derives from Utah Code Section 78-2-2(j), conferring 
jurisdiction on this Court over orders of any court of record over which the 
Court of Appeals does not have original appellate jurisdiction. Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-2-2Q) (West 2004).1 
Issue Presented 
Immuni ty from Suit 
The State seized Plaintiffs' snakes pursuant to a lawful search 
warrant issued incident to a criminal investigation and criminal judicial 
proceedings against Ryan Hoyer. Most of the snakes died during the 
pendency of the court proceedings. Plaintiffs claim the State negligently 
cared for the snakes, but the alleged injury arose out of the judicial 
proceedings against Ryan Hoyer. Is the State of Utah immune from 
liability? 
1
 Now codified at § 78A-3-102. See 2008 Utah Laws ch. 3 § 344. 
2 
A. Standard of Review 
Summary judgment is proper if "there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter 
of law." Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). This Court "review [s] the trial court's 
summary judgment for correctness, considering only whether the trial 
court correctly applied the law and correctly concluded that no disputed 
issues of material fact existed." Hermansen v. Tasulis, 2002 UT 52, f 10, 
48 P.3d 235. A trial court's interpretation of a statute constitutes a 
question of law that this Court also reviews for correctness. Blackner v. 
Dep't ofTransp., 2002 UT 44, f 8, 48 P.3d 949. 
B. Preservation of the Issue 
The State raised this issue through its motion for summary 
judgment and supporting memorandum. R. 304-341. The trial court 
granted that motion and dismissed Plaintiffs' complaint on December 13, 




The following statutory provision is attached as Addendum B: 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30d-301 (West 2004), now codified at § 63G-7-301. 
See 2008 Utah Laws ch. 382, § 1496.2 
Statement of the Case 
Nature of the Case 
Plaintiffs sued the State for damages they allege to have suffered 
when a number of the rubber boa snakes that the State seized from Ryan 
Hoyer died. 
Course of P r o c e e d i n g s and Dispos i t ion B e l o w 
Plaintiffs filed an initial complaint in the Third District Court on 
July 30, 2004. R. 1-7. They twice amended that complaint in September 
2006 and February 2007, each time naming new parties and causes of 
action. R. 176-180; 227-236; 284-287. The State of Utah was the only 
party properly served with Plaintiffs' complaint. R. 8-13. 
2
 Title 63 was recodified and renumbered in 2008. See 2008 Utah 
Laws ch. 382. For the ease of the Court's convenience, the State 
utilizes the former numbering in this brief. 
4 
On September 11, 2007, the State filed a motion for summary 
judgment respecting the sole negligence claim against it. R. 304-306. 
Plaintiffs opposed the motion, and it was fully briefed by both parties. R. 
307-341; 342-347; 350-60. The trial court heard oral argument and 
granted the State's motion from the bench. R. 379. At the court's 
direction, the State prepared a written order, which the trial court signed, 
without objection, on December 13, 2007. R. 380-384. 
Plaintiffs then filed a petition for permission to appeal an 
interlocutory order on January 3, 2008. R. 385-386. The State opposed 
the petition, arguing that the order granting summary judgment 
constituted a final order. Plaintiffs agreed and on January 24, they 
withdrew the petition. 
On January 17, 2008, Plaintiffs filed a motion in the district court, 
seeking an extension of time to file a notice of appeal. R. 403-406. The 
State did not oppose the motion. R. 409. Plaintiffs filed a notice of appeal 
with the clerk of the trial court on January 25. R. 413-415. Nine days 
later, the trial court granted Plaintiffs' motion and gave them leave to 
file a notice of appeal on or before February 14, 2008. R. 416-418. 
Plaintiffs did not refile or amend their previous notice of appeal. 
5 
Statement of the Facts 
On January 8, 2004, Second District Court Judge Glen Dawson 
issued a search warrant, authorizing agents for the State Division of 
Wildlife Resources to search Plaintiff Ryan Hoyer's residence. R. 309 and 
Ex. A at 317-318; 381. The State executed the warrant the next day and 
seized sixty-five (65) rubber boa snakes, a computer, and various 
materials pertaining to the snakes. R. 309; 381. The snakes were then 
used as evidence in criminal proceedings against Ryan Hoyer in the Davis 
County and Clearfield City Justice Courts. R. 309 and Ex. B at 327-328; 
382.3 
Ryan Hoyer was convicted in the Clearfield Justice Court on a 
charge of unlawfully possessing some of the snakes. R. 231, Compl. f 13; 
309 and Ex. B at 327-328. Mr. Hoyer appealed his conviction to the 
3
 At footnote 2 of their opening brief, Plaintiffs' contend for the 
first time on appeal that because photos of the snakes, not the snakes 
themselves, were introduced as evidence in the criminal court 
proceedings, the trial court erred when it found the snakes were used 
as evidence in those proceedings. Not only have Plaintiffs waived this 
argument by failing to preserve it in the trial court below, they have 
also failed to present this Court with any authority to support their 
claim. See Espinal v. Salt Lake City Bd. ofEduc, 797 P.2d 412, 413 
(Utah 1990). Moreover, this Court's decision in State v. Holgate, 2000 
UT 74, f 11, 20 P.3d 346, regards the sufficiency of evidence in support 
of a criminal conviction and that case has no application here. 
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Second District Court for a de novo proceeding, where he was once more 
found guilty. R. 309 and Ex. B at 330-333. Mr. Hoyer appealed that 
conviction to the Utah Court of Appeals. R. 310 and Ex. D at 335. That 
court affirmed Mr. Hoyer's conviction by a published decision on June 12, 
2008. Clearfield City u. Hoyer, 2008 UT App. 226. 
Most of the snakes died during the pendency of the criminal actions. 
R. 230-231, Compl. f 12. Plaintiffs claim the snakes died because of the 
State's negligence. R. 234, Compl. f 26. All of Plaintiffs'claimed 
damages arose out of the State's seizure of the snakes pursuant to a 
lawful warrant and judicial proceeding. R. 310 and Ex. E at 339; 382. 
But for that seizure, Plaintiffs would have no damages. Id. 
Summary of the Argument 
At common law, the State enjoyed sovereign immunity from all 
claims. The State waived a portion of that immunity when it enacted the 
original Governmental Immunity Act in 1965. The State remains 
immune from negligence unless a plaintiff can show that the State has 
waived its immunity. The State retains its immunity for any injury that 
"arises out of, in connection with, or results from . . . the institution or 
7 
prosecution of any judicial proceeding, even if malicious or without 
probable cause." Utah Code Ann. § 63-30d-301(5)(e) (West 2004). 
Plaintiffs' snakes perished after the State seized them as evidence 
pursuant to a search warrant issued by the Second Judicial District 
Court. Because the snakes' death arose out of the institution and 
prosecution of a judicial proceeding, the State retains immunity from suit. 
Argument 
The State is statutorily immune from liability for 
injuries that arose out of, in connection with, or 
resulted from the institution or prosecution of a judicial 
proceeding. 
Utah courts take a three-step approach to determine whether the 
State retains immunity from suit. Johnson v. Utah Dep't ofTransp., 
2006 UT 15, f 17; 133 P.3d 402; Wagner v. State, 2005 UT 54, f 12, 122 
P.3d 599; Ledfors v. Emery County Sch. Dist, 849 P.2d 1162, 1164 (Utah 
1993). Here, the first two questions are not in dispute and only the third 
inquiry remains - whether the State has retained its immunity from 
Plaintiffs' suit because the death of Plaintiffs' snakes "arose out of, in 
connection with, or result[ed] from . . . the institution or prosecution of 
any judicial or administrative proceeding." Utah Code Ann. § 63-30d-
301(5)(e) (West 2004). 
8 
Utah's courts have consistently acknowledged the necessity of 
governmental immunity in protecting the delivery of vital governmental 
services. And statutory wording is strictly construed when necessary to 
preserve immunity. Hall v. Utah State Dept ofCorr., 2001 UT 34, f 14, 
24 P.3d 958 (Utah 2001); see also, Taylor v. Ogden City Sch. Dist, 927 
P.2d 159, 162 (Utah 1996); Epting v. State, 546 P.2d 242, 243 (Utah 1976). 
Plaintiffs argue that the legislature did not intend for the State to be 
granted immunity in this case, because Plaintiffs' alleged damages arose 
not out of the institution or prosecution of a judicial proceeding, but were 
directly caused by or integrally related to the State's alleged negligence. 
This claim finds support neither in the statute's plain language nor in 
this Court's prior decisions under the immunity act. It should be 
rejected. 
A. Plaintiffs' damages arose out of a judicial 
proceeding. 
When this Court interprets any statute, the Court looks first "to 
the statute's plain language, and give[s] effect to the plain language, 
unless the language is ambiguous." Blackner u. Dept ofTransp., 2002 
UT 44, <j[ 12, 48 P.3d 949. The Court's "goal is to give effect to the 
9 
legislature's intent and purpose." Grappendorfv. Pleasant Grove City, 
2007 UT 84,1 9,173 P.3d 166. Moreover, this Court will not stray from 
the plain meaning of a statute when it "is unambiguous and there is no 
compelling reason to believe that the legislature has misspoken." Moss v. 
Pete Suazo Athletic Comm'n, 2007 UT 99, f 13 (citing Lyon v. Burton, 
2000 UT 19, f 17, 5 P.3d 616 ("[W]here the statutory language is 
unambiguous, we do not look beyond the language's plain meaning . . . ." 
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); see also Savage v. Utah 
Youth VilL, 2004 UT 102, <il 18, 104 P.3d 1242 (statute may be interpreted 
contrary to plain meaning only when that language "works an absurd 
result or is unreasonably confused, inoperable, or in blatant contravention 
of the express purpose of the statute" (internal quotation marks and 
citation omitted)). Plaintiffs contend that a plain reading of section 63-
30d-301(5)(e) leads to absurd results because granting the State immunity 
from liability, "would be to declare that the government has no duty to 
care for any property seized pursuant to a search warrant," Opening Br. 
at 16, and would allow for police misconduct with no civil recourse. Id. at 
23. But Plaintiffs overlook section 63-30d-202(3)(c), which permits suit 
against individual state employees for their willful misconduct, and also 
42 U.S.C. § 1983, which permits suit against individual government 
10 
actors for violation of a plaintiffs constitutional or federal statutory 
rights.4 
Under Utah Code section 63-30d-301(5), the State plainly retains 
sovereign immunity from suit when a plaintiffs injury "arises out of, in 
connection with, or results from" one of twenty enumerated fact patterns, 
including "(e) the institution or prosecution of any judicial or 
administrative proceeding, even if malicious or without probable cause." 
Id. at § 63-30d-301(5)(e). This Court has broadly interpreted the phrase 
"arises out of and has found that it plainly requires "only that there be 
some causal nexus between the risk and the resulting injury." Blackner, 
2002 UT 44, f 15 (citing Taylor, 927 P.2d at 163). The Court most 
recently adhered to this interpretation in Peck v. State of Utah, 2008 UT 
39. 
4
 Plaintiffs also contend that section 63-30d-301(5)(e) cannot be 
plainly read to grant the State immunity for negligently handling 
property seized pursuant to a search warrant, because to do so would 
render superfluous section 63-30d-301(2)(c), stating that governmental 
immunity is not retained for the negligent destruction of property "if 
the property were seized for the purpose of forfeiture." But property 
seized in connection with a criminal court search warrant and judicial 
proceeding and property seized under the state's civil forfeiture law do 
not stand on equal footing. Property seized by the state for civil 
forfeiture falls within a statutory scheme that is distinct from the 
property seized here. See, e.g., Utah Code Ann. § 24-1-1 et seq. (West 
2004 & 2007). 
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In Peck, the plaintiff sued the state for negligently allowing him to 
fall on his face while he was being physically restrained by a Utah 
Highway Patrol trooper. Id. fl. Peck fell after he had been arrested and 
handcuffed, but before the trooper could place him in a police cruiser to be 
transported to jail. Id. This Court held that Peck's claim was barred 
because there was a causal connection between Peck's injury and his 
incarceration in a place of legal confinement; that Peck's injury arose out 
of his incarceration; and that his claim therefore fell within the "plain 
language of Utah Code section 63-10-10(10) (1997)."5 Id. 
The Court reiterated that the phrase "arising out of is "very 
broad, general, and comprehensive," and that the phrase "imports a 
concept of causation" which this Court has long since concluded means 
"originating from, incident to, or connected with the item in question." 
Id.f 11 (citing Taylor, 927 P.2d at 163 and quoting Nat'l Farmers Union 
Prop. & Cas. Co. v. W. Cas. & Sur. Co., 577 P.2d 961, 963 (Utah 1978) 
(internal quotation marks omitted)). The Peck court examined the other 
terms set out in the statute's "broad introductory phrase," id. % 12, and 
determined that "in connection with" and '"results f rom' . . . similarly 
5
 The incarceration exception can now be found at § 63G-7-
301(5)(j). See Utah Laws ch. 382, § 1496. 
12 
connote a causal link between the injury and the government activity for 
which sovereign immunity has not been waived." Id. % 11. The Court 
concluded that "any injury that is caused by or originates from [the 
enumerated conduct] falls within the . . . exception." Id. 
Plaintiffs did not dispute any statements of fact in the proceedings 
below and it is without dispute that the State seized Plaintiffs' snakes 
under a search warrant issued in furtherance of a criminal proceeding 
against Ryan Hoyer. R. 309, 381. It is also undisputed that the State 
retained possession of the snakes to be used as evidence during the 
pendency of that proceeding and of Ryan Hoyer's successive appeals of 
his conviction. R. 309 and Ex. B at 327-328; 382; see fn 1, supra. And on 
appeal, Plaintiffs agree "that the issuance of the search warrant was a 
part of a judicial proceeding." Opening Br, p. 12. 
When those facts are viewed in their entirety and when giving effect 
to each term in Section 63-30d-301(e)(5), Plaintiffs' claimed injury 
plainly "arose out of the institution and prosecution of the judicial 
proceedings against Plaintiff Ryan Hoyer. Utah Code Ann. § 63-30d-
301(5)(e); see Peck, 2008 UT 39, f 12. The statute's plain language 
supports the district court's grant of summary judgment and it should be 
affirmed. 
13 
B. Stare dec is i s compe l s affirmance of the trial 
court's order. 
Plaintiffs next argue that the trial court erred in finding the State 
immune from liability because the proper test is not whether issuance of 
the search warrant was the '"but for" cause of Plaintiffs' injuries, but 
whether it was the direct or integral cause of the alleged harm.6 But in 
Ledfors v. Emery County School District, 849 P.2d 1162 (Utah 1993), this 
Court concluded that the immunity act "focuses on the conduct or 
situation out of which the injury arose, not on the theory of liability 
crafted by the plaintiff or the type of negligence alleged." Ledfors, 849 
P.2d at 1166; see Tiede v. State of Utah, 915 P.2d 500, 502 (rejecting 
plaintiffs attempt to evade the statutory exception by recharacterizing 
cause of the harm); see also Malcolm v. State, 878 P.2d 1144, 1146-1147 
(Utah 1994); S.H. v. State, 865 P.2d 1363, 1365 (Utah 1993); Higgins v. 
Salt Lake County, 855 P.2d 231, 240 (Utah 1993). Instead, commencing 
with this Court's decision in Taylor v. Ogden City School District, 927 
P.2d 159 (Utah 1996), Utah courts have held that a sufficient causal 
6
 In their brief on appeal, Plaintiffs unduly focus on whether 
their alleged injury arose out of the issuance of the search warrant, not 
the institution or prosecution of a judicial proceeding. In so doing, 
Plaintiffs "miss[ ] the forest for the trees." Peck, 2008 UT 39, \ 12. 
14 
relationship exists when "[b]ut for the [exception, the plaintiffs] injuries 
would not have occurred/' Id. at 163; see Blackner v. State, 2002 UT 44, ^ 
13, 15 (application of exception to waiver of immunity does not hinge on 
whether exception proximately caused injury; immunity ig retained where 
"but for" exception, plaintiff would not have been harmed); Barrenbrugge 
v. State, 2007 UT App. 263, f 13, 167 R3d 549, 553 (acknowledging this 
Court's use of "but for" causation). 
In Taylor, parents brought action on behalf of their minor child 
after he was pushed into an allegedly unsafe window by a fellow student 
and was injured. Taylor, 927 P.2d at 159. On certiorari, this Court first 
endorsed the expansive definition of "arises out of that the Court 
continues to apply today. See Peck, 2008 UT 39, f 12 (quoting Taylor, 927 
P.2d at 163). And in response to parents' claim that the injury bore a 
greater link to the dangerous window than to the assault, this Court 
stated that the phrase "'arises out of . . . is a phrase of much broader 
significance than caused by." Id. The Court continued that "[u]nder the 
phrase's ordinary meaning, the assault need not be the sole cause of the 
injury to except the government entity from liability . . . [t]he language 
demands only that there be some causal relationship between the injury 
and the risk' provided for." Id. The Court concluded that there was 
15 
"undoubtedly" some causal relationship between the child's injury and 
the assault upon him. "But for the assault, [the child's! injuries would 
not have occurred." Id. 
Plaintiffs acknowledge that to prevail under Taylor\ the State need 
only show "some causal relationship" between Plaintiffs' harm and the 
judicial proceedings exception. Opening Br., p. 13. But they contend that 
that relationship is greater than the "but for" cause and they urge this 
Court to adopt, instead, a standard of direct causation. "Those asking 
[the court] to overturn prior precedent have a substantial burden of 
persuasion." See State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393, 398 (Utah 1994). This 
Court has previously rejected a standard of direct causation and Plaintiffs 
offer this Court no compelling reason to retreat from the common law. See 
Blackner, 2003 UT 44, f 13; Taylor, 927 P.2d at 163. Instead, Plaintiffs go 
to great lengths to argue inapposite case law relative to the Utah Court of 
Appeals' interpretation of insurance liability contracts and insurance 
liability cases from outside the State of Utah. 
And while the State readily admits this Court has criticized the 
immunity act's reach from time to time, the Court has also recognized 
that "the legislature has spoken with clarity on the question of 
immunity," and thus this Court is "constrained by the plain language of 
16 
the Act and [by] prior case law on this point." Ledfors, 849 P.2d at 1167; 
see S.#.,865 P.2d at 1365 and at 1366 (Hall, C.J., dissenting); Malcolm, 
878 P.2d at 1147; Tiede, 915 P.2d at 504; Sanders v. Leavitt, 2001 UT 78, f 
44 , 37 P.3d 1052,1062 (Durham, J. concurring). It is therefore not for 
Plaintiffs to tailor the State's waiver of immunity more narrowly or to 
find that a theory of direct causation should succeed. That is a task 
reserved for the Utah State Legislature. This Court should affirm the trial 
court's order granting the State's motion for summary judgment and 
dismissing Plaintiffs' complaint with prejudice. 
Conclusion 
The State retains immunity from suit for Plaintiffs' negligence 
claim. The district court correctly concluded that Plaintiffs' claimed 
damages "arose out of the institution or prosecution of the judicial 
proceedings against Plaintiff Ryan Hoyer. This Court should affirm that 
court's dismissal of Plaintiffs' complaint. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this 21st day of July, 2008. 
£. Romano 
t Utah Attorney General 
j for Defendant/Appellee 
17 
Certificate of Service 
I certify that two true and correct copies of the foregoing Answer Brief 
of Appellee was served by U.S. mail, first-class postage prepaid, this 21s t 
day of July, 2008, to the following: 
STEPHEN D. SPENCER 
NATHAN WHITTAKER 
Day Shell & Liljenquist, LC 
45 East Vine Street 
Murray, Utah 84107 
(801) 262-6800 
Attorney for Plaintiffs/Appellants 
ly^fjr ^J^dL.- £s£^e/*~ 
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ADDENDUM A 
MATTHEW D. BATES (9861) 
BARRY G. LAWRENCE (5304) 
Assistant Utah Attorney General 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF (4666) 
Utah Attorney General 
Attorneys for Defendants 
160 East 300 South, Sixth Floor 
P.O. Box 140856 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0856 
Telephone: (801) 366-0100 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
RYAN HOYER, RICHARDS F. HOYER, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
STATE OF UTAH; JIM KARPOWITZ, 
RICHARD ASHCROFT, RUDY 
MUSCLOW, MILES MORETTI (in their 
official capacity as officials fo the Utah 
DWR), 
Defendants. 
ORDER GRANTING THE STATE'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 040916063 
Judge Anthony B. Quinn 
Procedural Background: This case arises out of the State of Utah's (the "State" or 
"defendant") seizure of plaintiffs' snakes pursuant to a search warrant executed upon plaintiff 
Ryan Hoyer. Plaintiffs assert that the State was negligent in caring for the snakes and assert 
damages for the value of the snakes. 
FILED DISTRICT CQUftT 
Third Judicial District 
DEC 1 3 2007 
SALT LAKE COUNT* 
By _ _ _ _ _ _ 
Ddfnrty CWk 
On September 11, 2007, the State filed its Motion for Summary Judgment as to Plaintiffs' 
Negligence Claim, along with a supporting memorandum, in which the Statefcasserted that 
plaintiffs' negligence claim against the State was barred by Utah Code Ann. § 63-30d-301(5)(e) 
of the Governmental Immunity Act of Utah (Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-30d-101, et. seq. (the 
"Immunity Act")), because their alleged damages arose out of "the institution or prosecution of 
[a] judicial proceeding." Plaintiffs filed a responsive memorandum on September 18, 2007. The 
State filed a reply memorandum on October 1,2007. 
Ruling on the Motion for Summary Judgment. The matter was submitted for decision, 
and a hearing took place on the State's Motion on November 20, 2007, at 8:30 a.m. Barry G. 
Lawrence and Matthew D. Bates, Assistant Attorneys General, appeared on behalf of the State; 
Stephen Spencer appeared on behalf of the plaintiffs. At the conclusion of oral argument, and 
having considered the pleadings and submissions of the parties, and the argument of counsel, the 
Court granted the State's Motion. 
The Court specifically Rules as follows: 
For purposes of the State's motion for summary judgment, the following facts are 
undisputed: 
L Plaintiffs' snakes were seized by the State pursuant to a search warrant that was 
issued by Judge Glenn Dawson of the Second District Court. 
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2. The Snakes were used as evidence in criminal proceedings against plaintiff Ryan 
Hoyer in both Davis County Justice Court and Clearfield City Justice Court* 
3. All of plaintiffs' claimed damages result from the seizure of the Snakes; but for 
the seizure of the Snakes, plaintiffs would not have suffered any damages. 
For purposes of the State's motion for summary judgment, this Court makes the 
following conclusions of law: 
1. The State's actions in seizing plaintiffs' snakes and prosecuting plaintiff Ryan Hoyer 
were governmental functions for which the State is immune absent a waiver of immunity. This is 
not disputed by plaintiffs. 
2. For purposes of this Motion, the State has admitted a waiver of immunity herein. 
3. An exception to that waiver of immunity exists in this case, pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 63-30d-301(5)(e), because plaintiffs' injuries all arose out of the institution or prosecution 
of judicial proceedings. The term "arises out o f has been construed broadly by the Utah 
Supreme Court and only requires that there be some causal nexus between the judicial 
proceeding and plaintiffs' injuries. But for the actions taken by the State pursuant to a judicial 
proceeding, plaintiffs would not have suffered injury. Accordingly, an exception to the waiver 
of immunity exists in this case. 
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4. Therefore, the State is immune from all of plaintiffs' claims of negligence in this 
matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-30d-301(5)(e) of the Governmental Immunity Act of 
Utah. 
ACCORDINGLY, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT: 
1. The State's Motion for Summary Judgment as to Plaintiffs' Negligence Claim is 
granted. 
2. Accordingly, all of plaintiffs' negligence claims against the State are hereby 
dismissed, on their merits and with prejudice. 
3. As this Order resolves all claims pending between the plaintiffs and the State of Utah, 
the Court hereby dismisses the State as a defendant in this matter, with prejudice. 
DATED this / $ day of Wwcmber, 2007. 
BY THE COURT: 
4 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on t h e - ^ _ day of November, 2007, pursuant to^Rule 7(f), Utah R. 
Civ. P., I caused to be served by fax transmission, a true and correct copy of foregoing 
(Proposed) ORDER GRANTING THE STATE'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT, to the following: 
Stephen D. Spencer 
DAY SHELL & LILJENQUIST, LC 
45 East Vine Street 
Murray, Utah 84107 
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ADDENDUM B 
63-30d-301. Waivers of immunity — Exceptions. 
(As amended by Laws 2004, c.267, §13) 
(1) (a) Immunity from suit of each governmental entity is 
waived as to any contractual obligation. 
(b) Actions arising out of contractual rights or 
obligations are not subject to the requirements of Sections 63-
30d-401, 63-30d-402, 63-30d-403, or 63-30d-601. 
(c) The Division of Water Resources is not liable for 
failure to deliver water from a reservoir or associated facility 
authorized by Title 73, Chapter 26, Bear River Development Act, 
if the failure to deliver the contractual amount of water is due 
to drought, other natural condition, or safety condition that 
causes a deficiency in the amount of available water. 
(2) Immunity from suit of each governmental entity is 
waived: 
(a) as to any action brought to recover, obtain possession 
of, or quiet title to real or personal property; 
(b) as to any action brought to foreclose mortgages or 
other liens on real or personal property, to determine any 
adverse claim on real or personal property, or to obtain an 
adjudication about any mortgage or other lien that the 
governmental entity may have or claim on real or personal 
property; 
(c) as to any action based on the negligent destruction, 
damage, or loss of goods, merchandise, or other property while 
it is in the possession of any governmental entity or employee, 
if the property was seized for the purpose of forfeiture under 
any provision of state law; 
(d) subject to Subsection 63-30d~302(1), as to any action 
brought under the authority of Article I, Section 22, of the 
Utah Constitution, for the recovery of compensation from the 
governmental entity when the governmental entity has taken or 
damaged private property for public uses without just 
compensation; 
(e) subject to Subsection 63-30d-302(2), as to any action 
brought to recover attorneys' fees under Sections 63-2-405 and 
63-2-802; 
(f) for actual damages under Title 67, Chapter 21, Utah 
Protection of Public Employees Act. 
(3) (a) Except as provided in Subsection (3)(b), immunity 
from suit of each governmental entity is waived as to any injury 
caused by: 
(i) a defective, unsafe, or dangerous condition of any 
highway, road, street, alley, crosswalk, sidewalk, culvert, 
tunnel, bridge, viaduct, or other structure located on them; or 
(ii) any defective or dangerous condition of a public 
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building, structure, dam, reservoir, or other public 
improvement. 
(b) Immunity is not waived if the injury arises out of, in 
connection with, or results from: 
(i) a latent dangerous or latent defective condition of any 
highway, road, street, alley, crosswalk, sidewalk, culvert, 
tunnel, bridge, viaduct, or other structure located on them; or 
(ii) a latent dangerous or latent defective condition of 
any public building, structure, dam, reservoir, or otJfcer public 
improvement. 
(4) Immunity is waived as to any injury proximately caused 
by a negligent act or omission of an employee committed within 
the scope of 
employment. 
(5) Immunity from suit of each governmental entity is not 
waived under Subsections (3) and (4) if the injury arises out 
of, in connection with, or results from: 
(a) the exercise or performance, or the failure to exercise 
or perform, a discretionary function, whether or not the 
discretion is abused; 
(b) assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, 
malicious prosecution, intentional trespass, abuse of process, 
libel, slander, deceit, interference with contract rights, 
infliction of mental anguish, or violation of civil rights; 
(c) the issuance, denial, suspension, or revocation of, or 
by the failure or refusal to issue, deny, suspend, or revoke, 
any permit, license, certificate, approval, order, or similar 
authorization; 
(d) a failure to make an inspection or by making an 
inadequate or negligent inspection; 
(e) the institution or prosecution of any judicial or 
administrative proceeding, even if malicious or without probable 
cause; 
(f) a misrepresentation by an employee whether or not it is 
negligent or intentional; 
(g) riots, unlawful assemblies, public demonstrations, mob 
violence, and civil disturbances; 
(h) the collection of and assessment of taxes; 
(i) the activities of the Utah National Guard; 
(j) the incarceration of any person in any state prison, 
county or city jail, or other place of legal confinement; 
(k) any natural condition on publicly owned or controlled 
lands, any condition existing in connection with an abandoned 
mine or mining operation, or any activity authorized by the 
School and Institutional Trust Lands Administration or the 
Division of Forestry, Fire, and State Lands; 
(1) research or implementation of cloud management or 
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seeding for the clearing of fog; 
(m) the management of flood waters, earthquakes, or natural 
disasters; 
(n) the construction, repair, or operation of flood or 
storm systems; 
(o) the operation of an emergency vehicle, while being 
driven in accordance with the requirements of Section 41-6a-208; 
(p) the activities of: 
(i) providing emergency medical assistance; 
(ii) fighting fire; 
(iii) regulating, mitigating, or handling hazardous 
materials or hazardous wastes; 
(iv) emergency evacuations; 
(v) transporting or removing injured persons to a place 
where emergency medical assistance can be rendered or where the 
person can be transported by a licensed ambulance service; or 
(vi) intervening during dam emergencies; 
(q) the exercise or performance, or the failure to exercise 
or perform, any function pursuant to Title 73, Chapter 10, Board 
of Water Resources - Division of Water Resources; or 
(r) unauthorized access to government records, data, or 
electronic information systems by any person or entity. 
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